The phenomenon of the so-called "emerging donors" - such as China, India and Brazil - is one of the most fascinating developments of our time, certain to fundamentally change the aid industry. Scholars around the world are now seeking to understand how the new donors' emergence changes the way we think about development and poverty reduction. Yet while several of the BRICS are increasingly important players in the development aid industry, one area remains under Western control: Democracy aid.

Promoting democracy is perhaps one of the most controversial foreign policy topics, and almost everyone has a strong opinion about it. Some see it as an important aspect of the West's strategy to maintain global liberal order, others believe it is hollow rhetoric merely meant to cover up economic interests. Outside of the United States and Europe, the issue is largely regarded as an outgrowth of cultural imperialism, not only useless but in many cases dangerous.

Criticism may be warrented, but very few seem to know what democracy aid actually is and what its effects are. In this context, Thomas Carothers' highly informative and detailed book provides an excellent guide. Although written more than a decade ago, it remains one of the best practical analyses of democracy aid. The author methodically explains all the different forms democracy aid can take - ranging from electoral aid (e.g. electoral monitoring), political party assistance, legislative assistance, media assistance and civic education, and pointing to the strengths and weaknesses of each.

Carothers, who has been a practionioner in the field of democracy aid for many years, is in favor of the practice in principle - but readily identifies the many failures and mistakes US democracy promoters have made and are still making all over the world. The four cases he presents - Guatemala, Nepal, Romania and Zambia - make a sobering read and include countless examples of how difficult promoting democracy is. His chapter on judicial reform, in particular, seemingly affirms the pessismistic notion held by many that "these things cannot be imposed but must grow from within."

Yet Carothers also points out that external factors matter - democratizations, after all, often take place in waves - and that there are examples of US democracy aid with positive effects - the most promiment of all remain Germany and Japan after World War II. But there are also more recent examples - such as the Philippines - in which US pressure contributed to bolstering democratic transitions.

Given that Brazil and India are spending growing amounts of money on development aid in faraway places, why have they not begun to spend resources on democracy aid, too? Just as the United States and Europe, they surely have a great interest in widespread democratization. In addition, their experiences of democratization are much more recent, and their socioeconomic realities often similar to non-democratic countries - so in theory, they would be well-placed engage in the pratice. And yet, Carothers at no point ponders the possibility of non-Western democracies promoting democracy themselves.

Some might say the 'liberal tradition' prevalent in the United States is based on the optimistic and rather native assumption that 'change is easy', something not visible in countries such as Brazil and India. Yet these emerging giants do finance development projects abroad, which is certainly driven by some optimism. A better explanation may be that democracy aid has a more interventionist ring to it than development aid. Trying to help people elsewhere prosper economically is one thing, telling them how to organize themselves politically is quite another.

One of Carothers' more intriguing arguments is that US-Americans support their government's attempts to promote democracy abroad because they think democracy - and specifically, their model of democarcy - is the superior political system. This leads, as the author shows, to at times grotesque situations in which US democracy promoters encourage the adoption of a political model exactly like the one of the United States, even if that makes little sense in another society's context (the same is true for European governments). Accoringly, the conviction of their political system's superiority may simply not be strong enough in Brazil and India to allow for the rather bold step of promoting it abroad.

The question then is - can the U.S. political system become dysfunctional enough for its citizens to reject any attempts to export their model? A mere glance at U.S. politics reveals historic political deadlock, highly controversial campaign finance laws, growing barriers to voter registration in some states that may significantly lower turnout among the poor, a presidental election in 2000 that suffered from potentially decisive irregularities and highly politicized supreme court, etc. US-American citizens are generally aware of these probelms, but they still supports US democracy promotion.

Also, will Indians and Brazilians one day come to like their political system so much that they begin to try to export it? Or will democracy promotion become a thing of the past anyways once China's economy will overtake that of the United States? After all, it the first time in more than a century that the world's leading economy is a non-democratic state.

Carothers does not answer any of these questions, which most likely seemed irrelevant at the time the book was written. Still, his work is a highly readable and sheds light on a little known but important topic in international politics.

Edited by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi

What is the future of liberal order in a Post-Western World? In tomorrow’s multipolar order, who will promote and defend the liberal concepts and ideas that make our current system to unique? One of the topics for which these questions are particularly pertinent is democracy promotion. We are witnessing a notable shift of power towards countries that are more reluctant when it comes to democracy promotion or reject it entirely. Although some of tomorrow’s global powers, such as Brazil and India, are democratic, it is far from certain that waning Western powers can simply pass the torch of democracy promotion to Brasília and New Delhi. In addition, the consequences of the Arab Spring remain uncertain, and democratic regimes seem highly fragile in Afghanistan and Iraq, countries where the United States spent great resources to plant the seeds of democracy.

Before addressing these questions, however, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of democracy promotion itself, something generally frowned upon outside of Europe and the United States. Even though this collection of essays has been published twelve years ago, it probably remains one of the best studies on this topic.

At the very outset, the analysis shows how much our thinking about democracy has changed in the past decade: Prior to September 11, the War on Terror, and an Iraq War that would severely taint the idea of democracy promotion, the editors confidently assert in the introduction that “democracy has triumphed”, and that democracy was “increasingly the only legitimate means by which we can manage our political affairs effectively.” And yet, as if they had foreseen what was about to come, they warn that the United States “has to understand the limits of its power. If it fails to do so, it could very easily get involved in the same quixotic crusades that cost it so dear during the Cold War.”

In part one, Michal Doyle, Randall Schweller and Steve Smith provide thorough theoretical accounts of the practice of democracy promotion. Doyle warns of the pitfalls of buying into a simplistic worldview made up of Wilsonian liberals who support democracy promotion versus realists (such as Kissinger) who reject it. Rather, there are multiple strands of each tradition, and their conceptions and worldviews can differ significantly. Kant of course plays a key role in the analysis, and his insights about the ‘liberal peace’ provide, until today, a crucial intellectual foundation for those arguing in favor of democracy promotion.

Schweller offers a potent critique of democracy promotion by arguing that even in an ideal world full of democracies and perfectly equally distributed resources, the underlying causes of war remain firmly in place. Smith’s chapter provides a scathing assessment of US democracy promotion. He argues that democracy promotion has been present throughout in US foreign policy makers’ rhetoric, but actual US foreign policy had usually little to do with noble Wilsonian ideas, for example in Latin America. G. John Ikenberry revisits some of these ideas about the “imperial elements” of today’s order in his book ‘Liberal Leviathan’, reviewed in a recent blog post.

In part two, which consists chapters by Tony Smith, G. John Ikenberry and Henry Nau, the authors look at democracy promotion as an American ‘Grand Strategy’. Smith sees democracy promotion as more than a fig leaf that merely exists to disguise true US national interests. Rather, democracy promotion is part of a greater American narrative, an important element of the United States’ “mission” in the world. US culture is thus an important factor in explaining democracy promotion. Ikenberry largely supports this claim in his chapter.

For those seeking to understand the future of democracy promotion and whether emerging powers will be willing and able to support democracy, Smith's chapter is highly relevant. The cultural factors Smith identifies are almost certainly unique to the United States, and it seems unlikely that Brazil or India will feel the urge to promote democracy. Exceptionalism is an important element of India's identity, but it certainly does not see itself as a 'city on the hill' that serves as referenec to others. On the other hand, one could argue that greater economic and political power may change emerging powers’ world views in the same way that the United States’ rise a century ago had a profound impact on the way US society sees its own role in the world. Henry Nau’s chapter is more concerned with the practical side of democracy promotion, and he argues that rather than relying on a one-size-fits-all approach, the US must adapt its strategy to the specific characteristics of the host country – a claim similar to that made by Steve Smith earlier.

In the third part, which consists of chapters by Ole Holsti, Thomas Carothers, Jason Ralph and Michael Cox, the authors look at how public opinion and domestic politics influence US democracy promotion. Holsti shows that many US citizens are wary of the practice. This is remarkable given that the year 2000 can, in many ways, be seen as a high point in global thinking about democracy promotion. James Traub’s Foreign Affairs article about the U.N.’s success in East Timor, for example, symbolized the West’s great confidence in its capacity to spread democracy. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to have reduced public support for the practice even further.

In addition, growing collective frustration with the United States’ political system may have begun to reduce confidence in the strengths of democracy itself. Thomas Carothers, the leading analyst of the US democracy promotion strategies, reiterates Nau’s arguments and says US democracy promoters are often unaware of the fact that a successful democracy does not necessarily have to look exactly like the United States’ political system. It is here in particular that emerging powers such as India and Brazil may be more pragmatic: Brazilian and Indian thinkers tend to much more aware of the flaws of their own democracy and perhaps more modest when speaking of their democracy as a model for others. In this part’s final chapter, Cox reflects on the Clinton administration’s democracy promotion record and confirms an idea confirmed by many other authors: Democracy promotion is far more than the idealist icing on an essentially realist cake. Rather, it is often an essential part of defending US nationalist interest.

The fourth and final chapter provides insights into different regions’ experience with US democracy promotion. Peter Rutland points to the deep flaws in the United States’ decision to push for both democratization and the introduction of capitalism in Russia at the same time, thus contributing to the failure of both. In the same way, Georg Sorensen is highly critical of US efforts to promote democracy in Africa. William Robinson and Barry Gills provide the book’s most frontal assault on US democracy promotion, arguing that it merely meant to serve US economic interests. The two last chapters in particular are very interesting in the light of the United States’ reaction to the recent revolutions in the Middle East.

None of the authors consider that the United States could one day ‘outsource’ democracy promotion to other actors such as Brazil or India. Still, this book is required reading for all those who seek to understand the future of democracy promotion in a Post-Western Word.