This Saturday, Lula will once again make world leaders stare in disbelief when he travels to Iran, one of the world’s most isolated regimes, to strengthen Brazilian-Iranian ties. Yet, also within Brazil, the few who care about foreign 
policy fiercely criticize the Brazil’s strategy prior to the visit. “I hope that he visits the prisoners”, Shirin Ebadi, Iran’s prominent exiled human rights advocate said yesterday in an interview with O Globo, one of Brazil’s major newspapers from Rio de Janeiro. Clóvis Rossi, one of Brazil’s most influential columnists, recently wrote that Brazil’s green-and yellow national squad jersey was “covered with blood” after Ahmedinejad had been given one during an official visit. And José Serra, the leading presidential candidate from the opposition party, harshly criticized Lula for cozying up to a ruler reminiscent to Brazil’s military dictatorship both Lula and Serra fought against in the 1970s to establish democracy. Why then, does Lula, a savvy politician and diplomat who knows to read the voters’ minds like few other, engage with a human-rights abusing regime that may seek to build a nuclear bomb?
There are four main aspects that explain Lula’s policy.
The first reason is what Rubens Ricupero, a former ambassador to the United States, called Lula’s “constant search for the spotlight”. While Lula has retained his natural and authentic style as he rose from union leader to President, he is extremely driven and ambitious. Who else would have agreed to running yet another time after having lost three presidential bids in a row? Unlike his predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who maintains a low-key profile, Lula vows to remain in public life after his second term ends in on December 31, 2010- as World Bank President, UN Secretary General, as Nobel Peace Prize-winning international negotiator, or as highly influential mentor of President Rousseff, his chosen successor. Easing tensions
between Iran and the rest of the world would be quite a feat, and Lula could be sure to receive further praise.
The second reason can be explained by a genuine belief by President Lula and Foreign Minister Amorim that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is flawed, and that the West uses the NPT to impose injust rules on the rest. Israel continues to deny its nuclear weapon status, and India was even recognized as a nuclear weapon state by the United States, even though it never signed the NPT. So why is the West so worried about Iran? Brazil also points out that nuclear weapons states have done too little to honor their obligations- namely, to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles.
Thirdly, Brazil believes that sanctions make no sense, and that they are often the prelude to military intervention. “Iran should not be pushed against the wall”, Lula stresses. He has a point. Sanctions are a popular but desperate effort to influence a misbehaving member of the family. Aside from punishing the local population, they rarely have the desired effect. Worse still, they often strengthen a rogue states’s resolve. However, Brazil is not categorically opposed to sanctions, but it only supports them if there is conclusive evidence that Iran wants the bomb. Lula argues that Iran’s case shows parallels to Iraq in 2003, when the United States wrongly concluded that Iraq was secretly developing weapons of mass destruction.
This is emphasized by the fact that Brazil recognizes its own past experience in Iran’s current troubles. In the 1970s, Brazil ran the risk of becoming the pariah Tehran is today. Under international pressure, especially from the United States, Brazil set up secret nuclear activities, which allowed it to develop indigenous enrichment capacity. In Brazil’s eyes, increased international pressure and a looming US intervention will only increase Iran’s necessity to obtain nuclear weapons.
Finally, Brazil’s Iran strategy is the result of Brazil’s “fringe-strategy”. As the country rises, it aims to remain on the fringes of the liberal Western core countries to maximize its strategic gains. This entails aligning with the West on some issues, such as international finance, and opposing it on others. Its foreign policy makers believe that Brazil will be strongest by straddling both worlds. Iran’s behavior has little impact on Brazil, but the issue is an excellent opportunity to show the West that Brazil’s support does not come for free.
So is Lula right to travel to Tehran this weekend and engage? The answer is yes. On the one hand, Lula may be criticized for failing to condemn Iran’s human rights abuses and its failure to be more transparent about Iran’s intentions. His insistence to negotiate may give Iran the time it needs to build the nuclear bomb. But, Amorim is right to point out that a successful mediator needs to remain neutral. It is unclear whether Iran trusts Brazil, or whether Brazil has any influence over Iran, but it is be worth a try. After all, nobody really believes sanctions will convince Iran to change its mind anyway- so the argument that Lula’s diplomatic overtures give Iran more time are unconvincing. The White House even described Lula’s visit as the “last chance” Iran had to change its ways. If Iran really seeks to build the bomb, nobody can stop it, and not even Lula’s star power will be sufficient to alter Iran’s strategy. In that case, Brazil would have to take a 180 degree turn and join the West. But considering Amorim’s and Lula’s experience, there is no doubt Brazil is pragmatic enough to pull that off as well.
