The weeks before Carnival in Brazil are somewhat comparable to the month of August in France - students are on vacation, traffic in the big cities is unusually bearable, and business is a bit slower than usual. It is also an excellent time for policy makers and analysts to quietly prepare for the challenges they are likely to face during the year of 2012. One of the key questions for Brazilian decision makers - both in domestic and foreign policy - this year will be how to deal with China's growing influence. Brazil's strategy is not only crucial for the bilateral ties between China and Brazil, but also fundamentally influences the way Brazil would like to position itself in the larger context of an historic and inexorable shift of power towards the BRICS.

A key factor that shapes Brazil's strategy towards China is, interestingly enough, an utter lack of preparedness and lack of knowledge about China. At first glance, this may come as a surprise. As Maciel and Nedal point out in an excellent book chapter on Brazil- China relations (perhaps the best currently on the market), Brazil's Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira argued as early as 1974 that China "had consolidated itself as an emerging power", urging his President Geisel to normalize diplomatic relations to the PRC. After the Cold War, a consensus emerged among Brazil's foreign policy makers that Brazil needed to normalize its participation in international institutions and diversify its partnerships - a move that, on the multilateral level, regularly exposed China to Brazil. Under President Lula, Brazil fully embraced the "emerging power" category (which in Brazil's eyes also included China), and began to prioritize ties with other emerging powers.

So then why has Brazil been so insecure and clumsy when dealing with China? Not only was Brazil's official recognition of China’s market status never implemented (revealing internal differences), but the domestic debate about China's growing influence is dominated by radical and often uninformed voices. For example, recent sinophobia among Brazil's business community is largely based on inflated estimates about China's FDI in Brazil.

In 2005, Brazil's grossly overestimated the strength of China-Brazil ties when it expected China to support Brazil's bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council - even though China's reluctance to do so was no secret, largely because Brazil's bid was tied to Japan's. Finally, there seems to be an odd difference between the quality of ties on the multilateral and the bilateral level, the latter being much more complicated.

One key problem is that the Brazilian government has simply begun too late to prepare for Chinese dominance. As Maciel and Nedal point out,

The Brazilian embassy in Beijing and the consular office in Shanghai are severely understaffed (the embassy has only 12 diplomats, less people than the Brazilian embassy in Paraguay) and receive very little support and attention from the Foreign Ministry.

Yet the government is not the only one to blame. The authors rightly argue that

There are also other, more structural, factors at play at the social and institutional levels. Brazil still has virtually no Sinologists or university courses on Chinese history, economy, politics, legislation, business culture or other such topics, and Chinese language studies are only now being popularized. As a result, the number of Chinese speakers or skilled China hands in private enterprises and especially in civil service is very small.

Universities are beginning to react. For example, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) is now offering scholarships for its students to study at Bejing's Normal University, and FGV's Center for International Relations is organizing a growing number of China-related events. Yet Brazil's foreign ministry also needs to do more. As Matias Spektor, a colleague at FGV, recently pointed out in an interview with Valor Econômico, Brazil knows too little about its largest trading partner and needs to increase its capacity to "manipulate China" in its favor - largely by building up a great diplomatic presence in Beijing, convince its diplomats to learn Mandarin, and to seek to understand the centers of power in China. After all, China's influence in Brazil is set to rise. There is a growing consensus in Brazil that protectionist measures against Chinese goods are mere palliative measures that may increase inflation. Rather, Brazil needs to undertake reforms to boost its own productivity to be able to compete successfully.

One must be fair enough to point out, though, that Brazil is far from the only country that struggles to come to terms with this reality. The international academic IR community, dominated by thinkers based in the United States, may have underestimated the speed of change. Yesterday, while preparing a lecture on the future of global order I reread "International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity", with contributions by the IR world's heavy-weight scholars such as John Ikenberry, Stephen Walt and Robert Jervis. Ikenberry's opening text is engaging, but his deliberations on US dominance and unipolarity (written in 2008) feel oddly out of date - for example, Ikenberry writes that unipolarity "is extraordinary and has the potential to endure beyond a historical 'moment'", a notion has been largely discarded only 4 years later.

In retrospect, China's growing role in the world (and particular importance to commodity suppliers) should have been clear long ago - instead, societies around the world such as Brazil now have to rapidly develop the skills and knowledge necessary to "manipulate China" - it remains to be seen if Brazil's foreign ministry heeds Spektor's calls. Optimists who expect quick changes may be disappointed: As a Brazilian diplomat recently told me, European capitals such as Paris, Rome and Berlin still rank far above Beijing on Brazil's young diplomats' wish lists.

http://cpdoc.fgv.br/relacoesinternacionais/reportagens/01022012

Dando prosseguimento a um convênio firmado no ano passado entre a Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) e o Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) para estabelecer a Cátedra de Estudos Indianos, a FGV dá as boas-vindas esse mês ao Prof. Kuldip Singh, primeiro professor visitante a assumir essa posição.

Ele estará baseado na Escola de Ciências Sociais e História (CPDOC) da FGV, no Rio de Janeiro, por um semestre, e lecionará a disciplina de graduação “India in contemporary times” (Índia na contemporaneidade) e o curso “India in Global Politics with focus on Asia” (Índia na política global, com foco na Ásia), em nível de pós-graduação. Adicionalmente, ele dará uma palestra aberta ao público na FGV, na segunda metade do semestre.

Kuldip Singh é professor de Ciência Política e Diretor do Departamento de Ciência Política na Universidade Guru Nanak Dev (GNDU) em Amritsar. Ele possui um M.A., um M.Phil e um PhD pela GNDU, e escreveu sua tese de doutorado sobre a política de ajuda internacional da União Soviética para a Índia entre 1955 e 1971. Suas publicações recentes incluem:

· "Global Warming and Central Asia: Political and Social Context" Man and Development Vol.33, No.2 June 2011.

· "Contextualising Central Asia in Contemporary Global Order" in Emmanual Nahar (ed.), India´s Foreign Policy; Problems and Prospects ( New Delhi. 2011)

· "Environmental Challenges and Central Asia with Focus on Water Related Problems", Contemporary Central Asia (Special issue 2011)

· "Russia's Deideologized Drive for Globalisation", World Focus, No.382 October 2011

· "India, Central Asia and the Changing Contours of War on Terrorism", World Focus. No.383-84, November-December 2011

A Cátedra de Estudos Indianos é criada em um momento em que se testemunha a emergência do Brasil e da Índia como jogadores-chave nas relações internacionais. Há, hoje, um crescente consenso pelo mundo de que não é possível lidar com muitos desafios, como mudança climática e proliferação nuclear, sem levar em consideração as posições desses dois países. Por essa razão, é crucial que Brasil e Índia entendam as perspectivas um do outro. Além de terem ambições geopolíticas similares, ambos os países enfrentam desafios domésticos análogos, como desigualdade, pouca inclusão social e urbanização acelerada. Para fortalecer a cooperação e aprender mais a respeito um do outro, novas formas de interação devem ser criadas para estimular a comunicação entre atores da sociedade civil e da academia, nesses dois países.

O convênio entre a FGV e o ICCR para criar essa posição representa um passo significativo nessa direção.

Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), Latin America's no.1 think tank and one of Brazil's leading universities, is launching an executive program in International Relations in São Paulo, responding to a growing demand in the continent's financial and economic hub and a necessity to respond to the challenges Brazil's growing international exposure and involvement bring with it.

The program is designed to train decision-makers who act in private and public companies, NGOs, consultancies, law firms, the financial sector, government agencies, the media and international organizations to be able to analyze international affairs and to take informed decisions in complex situations. The program's teaching staff is composed of academics with significant international experience.

A similar executive program was launched in 2008 on FGV's Rio de Janeiro campus and its graduates have taken up jobs at organizations such as the World Bank, Abin, Agência Efe, Agence France Press (AFP), American University, Embratel, Globo News, London School of Economics (LSE), Petrobrás, the Secretariat for International Relations at Rio de Janeiro's Mayoral Office, the Ministry of Transport of Rio de Janeiro State, Souza Cruz, the University of Geneva and Vale.

The program consists of 10 courses, all of which provide both theoretical background and policy-related skills which seek to strengthen the student's capacity to deal with complex real-life scenarios. Case studies are used extensively in which students have to write memos and brief external decision-makers on which strategy to pursue in specific situations. In addition, high-level decision makers in foreign affairs are invited regularly to engage with the students. Classes are taught in Portuguese, but most reading is in English, and many international students have graduated from the program. In order to allow students to continue working, classes take place on Saturdays.

Classes begin on May 5, 2012 and take place at FGV's campus on Avenida Paulista. To learn more, click here.

The meeting will cover wide-ranging issues such as trade, the global economy, international security, agriculture, health and innovation, international terrorism, climate change, food and energy security and global governance reform - thus virtually covering all imaginable topics of global affairs (except human rights). Yet in order to truly make an impact and not just merely produce a lukewarm declaration, the summit's participants will have to focus on big themes and develop innovative ideas to show the rest of the world that the BRICS are capable of finding consensus regarding some of the most complex global challenges. Put differently, the BRICS should seize the chance of the summit to exercise international leadership.

One could argue that the since the first meeting in Russia in 2009, the BRICS summits have steadily become more productive. As I wrote in an article in April 2011, the summit in Sanya (China) was quite remarkable because South Africa's inclusion turned out to be a success, and because China and Russia came close to supporting India’s and Brazil’s bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. As the BRICS' economic and political importance is larger today than ever before, the opportunity to turn into a global agenda-setter is even greater.

As Manmohan Singh has rightly pointed out ahead of the summit, "the agenda of BRICS has gone beyond the purely economic to include issues such as international terrorism, climate change and food and energy security." This statement seems to reflect a growing consensus among Indian policy makers and analysts. For example, many of the topics that will be debated at the 4th BRICS Academic Forum (which takes place in New Delhi one month prior to the leaders' summit) have little to do with the economy, but include broad themes such as technology sharing, urbanization and education.

Arguing along similar lines, Matias Spektor, Professor of International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) recently argued in an op-ed in Folha de São Paulo that the BRICS' task should be to find a common position regarding today's most convoluted challenge - the tense political situation in the Middle East. He writes that given the growing risk of armed conflict between Israel and Iran, the BRICS have the chance to play a mediating role and help deescalate the situation. With regard of the Arab Spring, Spektor points out that the BRICS have been too slow to respond to the new situation constructively, and recommends that the BRICS consider the concept of the "responsibility while protecting", an idea the Brazilian government avidly promotes since Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff first used it during her speech in the UN General Assembly last year. Recently a Brazilian diplomat pointed out that on top of the points raised by Spektor, the BRICS could support the Arab Peace Initiative.

If only one of the ideas mentioned above could be incorporated into the final declaration, the 4th BRICS summit would turn into a great success. But one should be careful not to overestimate the BRICS' capacity to find a common denominator on such big issues. As a diplomat who participated in all four summits recently pointed out to me, BRICS summits lack the interaction and spontaneity necessary to come up with bold ideas. Russia, for example, already plays a leading role in the negotiations with Iran, so why should it allow the BRICS to enter the fray?

This points to a more general problem with the BRICS (particularly in comparison to IBSA): While Brazil, India and South Africa are pushing for a significant redistribution of institutional power, China and Russia are status-quo powers reluctant to change a system that has served them well over the past decades.

The new Global Go To Think Tanks Report, published last week by the University of Pennsylvania, is the most comprehensive ranking of the world’s top think tanks. It is based on an annual global peer and expert survey of almost 1500 scholars, policymakers, journalists, and regional and subject area experts. Given the rigor and scope of the process, the Report, which evaluated over 5000 think tanks, has been described as the insider’s guide to the global marketplace of ideas.

Think tanks matter not only because they serve as a bridge between academia and policy, but also because they are instrumental actors in the formulation of the global discourse. Economic think tanks influence the way citizens and policy makers around the world think about growth, development and inequality. Environmental think tanks provide the information necessary to form opinions about global warming, pollution, etc. Foreign policy think tanks, for their part, fundamentally shape the way we think about issues such as human rights, global governance and humanitarian intervention.

Traditionally, the global discourse has been dominated by the United States and Europe, but the shift of power to emerging actors such as China, India and Brazil may begin to change that. When I recently told a Brazilian diplomat that established actors had increasing difficulties to control the public discouse, he questioned my assessment, saying that the Western media, think tanks and academia were still overwhelmingly dominant. While this is no doubt the case - an Indonesian who seeks more information about Brazil is still most likely to read the Financial Times, and not The Hindu or the Folha de São Paulo - one cannot deny non-Western agenda setters are slowly emerging. Think tanks from emerging powers play an important role in this process.

Over 1800 think tanks from the United States and over 1500 from the European Union were evaluated, compared to only 495 from China, around 300 from India and 82 from Brazil. Yet the global rankings shows that despite their lower number, think tanks located outside of Europe and the United States are increasingly influential.

As an example, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), based in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, ranks 27th in the list of the World's Top Think Thanks, followed by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Both institutions lead their respective regions, South America and Asia. In the theme-specific evaluations, FGV ranks in the 30 most influential think tanks in the areas of international development (13th), domestic economic policy (18th) and social policy (18th). A mere ten years ago, such a prominent role for an institute in Brazil would have been unthinkable. This shows that global thinking today is far more distributed today than we may think.

Yet, as I have pointed out in a recent article about a global ranking of universities by the New York Times (in which FGV ranked among the top 100), emerging powers still have a long way ahead of them before they can truly compete with established actors in the fierce struggle to define the global discourse. Universities, think tanks and the media in the United States and Europe still have greater resources and continue to attract talents from all over the world. Still, on all levels, the global hierarchies are increasingly in flux. Think tanks such as FGV and CASS are set to turn into global agenda setters. In the New York Times ranking, Fudan University ranked closely behind Berkeley and ahead of Georgetown. Al Jazeera has turned into a true alternative to CNN, and newspapers such as The Hindu are beginning to seek an international audience.

Such a development is to be welcomed by both emerging and established powers. The global discourse can only gain by a greater number of participants who can offer different perspectives and help governments learn from each other and design smarter policies.

http://fgvnoticias.fgv.br/noticia/fgv-lanca-mba-em-relacoes-internacionais-em-sao-paulo

No dia 5 de maio deste ano começam as aulas da primeira turma do MBA em Relações Internacionais da FGV em São Paulo. O curso existe desde 2009 no Rio de Janeiro, mas contará com conteúdos específicos que respondem às necessidades do mercado paulistano.

“São Paulo é uma das dez principais cidades do mundo, portanto tem importância enorme no cenário internacional. Há uma grande demanda no mercado paulista por um curso que prepare profissionais capacitados a atuar em ambientes verdadeiramente globais”, explica Oliver Stuenkel, professor de Relações Internacionais e coordenador do MBA.
As aulas do MBA em RI acontecerão aos sábados, no prédio da Av. Paulista.
 

Sobre o MBA

Qual o papel da guerra e da paz no século XXI? De que modo tem evoluído o equilíbrio de poder diante das transformações estruturais do mundo contemporâneo? Qual é o ambiente estratégico em que vivemos e o que há de novo nas relações internacionais nos dias de hoje? O MBA em Relações Internacionais da FGV conta com uma equipe multidisciplinar que prepara seus alunos para responder a essas perguntas com sofisticação. O foco recai na utilização de conceitos para elucidar casos concretos e situações reais na política internacional.

Objetivo

Oferecer treinamento especializado em relações internacionais. O objetivo é qualificar o aluno para lidar criticamente com a conjuntura internacional, bem como capacitá-lo a atuar em ambientes internacionais com destreza.

Público Alvo

Profissionais (graduados) expostos ao meio internacional que precisem desenvolver seu instrumental analítico, principalmente para atuar no poder público, em empresas públicas e privadas, consultorias especializadas, firmas de advocacia, sistema financeiro, no jornalismo e em organizações e grupos internacionais, e que tenham no mínimo 04 anos de experiência profissional relevante.

Programa

1. Análise Política Internacional
2. Questões Internacionais Contemporâneas
3. Políticas Externas Comparadas
4. Economia Internacional
5. Finanças Internacionais
6. Direito Internacional
7. O Brasil no Mundo
8. Orientações de Projetos
9. Negociações Complexas (on-line)
10. Gestão Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Sustentável

Carga horária total: 504 horas/aula

Coordenação

Prof. Dr. Oliver Stuenkel

Data de início

- 05 de maio de 2012
Aos sábados (quinzenalmente) das 8h30 às 18h

Mais informações:

http://mgm-saopaulo.fgv.br/cursos-detalhes/mba-em-relacoes-internacionais

Following up on an agreement  signed last year between Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) and the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) to establish the Chair of Indian Studies, FGV welcomed this month Prof. Kuldip Singh, the first visiting professor to take to take up the Chair of Indian Studies. He will be based at FGV's School of Social Science and History (CPDOC) in Rio de Janeiro for one semester and teach the undergraduate course "India in Contemporary Times" and "India in Global Politics with Focus on Asia" at graduate level. He will also give one public lecture at FGV in the second half of the semester.

Kuldip Singh is Professor of Political Science and Head of the Department of Political Science at Guru Nanak Dev University (GNDU) in Amritsar. He holds an M.A., M.Phil and PhD from GNDU and wrote this doctoral thesis on the Politics of Soviet Aid to India between 1955 - 1971. His recent publications include:

• "Global Warming and Central Asia: Political and Social Context" Man and Development Vol.33, No.2 June 2011.
• "Contextualising Central Asia in Contemporary Global Order"  in Emmanual Nahar (ed.)
  India´s Foreign Policy; Problems and Prospects ( New Delhi. 2011)
• "Environmental Challenges and Central Asia with Focus on Water Related Problems"
  Contemporary Central Asia (Special issue 2011)
• "Russia's Deideologized Drive for Globalisation", World Focus , No.382 October 2011
• "India , Central Asia and the Changing Contours of War on Terrorism", World Focus. No.383-84, Nonvember- December 2011

The Chair of Indian Studies comes into being as we witness the emergence of India and Brazil as key players in international affairs. There is growing consensus around the world that many challenges, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation, cannot be dealt with without taking into account the positions of these two countries. For this reason, it is crucial that Brazil and India understand each other’s perspectives. Besides having similar geopolitical ambitions, both countries are dealing with analogous domestic challenges, like inequality, a lack of social inclusion and accelerated urbanization. To strengthen cooperation, and to learn more about each other, new forms of interaction must be created to stimulate the communication between actors in civil society and academia in these two countries. The agreement between FGV and the ICCR to create this position represents a significant step in this direction.

Contact Prof. Kuldip Singh via facebook here.

Qual o papel da guerra e da paz no século XXI? De que modo tem evoluído o equilíbrio de poder diante das transformações estruturais do mundo contemporâneo? Qual é o ambiente estratégico em que vivemos e o que há de novo nas relações internacionais nos dias de hoje? A Formação Complementar em Relações Internacionais da FGV conta com uma equipe multidisciplinar que prepara seus alunos para responder a essas perguntas com sofisticação. O foco recai na utilização de conceitos para elucidar casos concretos e situações reais na política internacional.

O Programa de Formação Complementar em Relações Internacionais é para alunos de todas as Escolas da FGV em São Paulo. Os estudantes podem cursar as disciplinas oferecidas como eletivas. Aqueles que optarem por cursar as 4 disciplinas do Programa recebem um Certificado de Formação Complementar em "Relações Internacionais no Mundo Contemporâneo".

A Formação Complementar é a opção ideal para aqueles que estão em dúvida entre um bacharelado em Relações Internacionais e outra área de estudo. Ela permite que o aluno da Fundação combine a excelência tradicional dos cursos de graduação oferecidos na FGV com o estudo especializado das Relações Internacionais.

Cursos no primeiro semestre de 2012:

O Brasil nas Relações Internacionais (4 créditos)

Seg. / Qua. 13h00- 14h50 (EAESP)

Prof. Guilherme Casarões

Guilherme Stolle Paixão e Casarões é mestre em Relações Internacionais pela Universidade de Campinas (2011) e em Ciência Política pela Universidade de São Paulo (2008), especialista em História e Culturas Políticas pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (2006) e graduado em Relações Internacionais pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (2005). Atualmente, cursa o doutorado em Ciência Política pela USP. É co-autor do livro "A Organização das Nações Unidas", publicado pela Ed. Del Rey (2006). Tem capítulos de livros e artigos publicados na área de Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais, com ênfase em Política Brasileira e Instituições Políticas, Teoria das Relações Internacionais e Política Externa Brasileira.

História das Relações Internacionais (4 créditos)

Seg. / Qua. 7h00 - 8h50 (EESP)

Prof. Juliana Viggiano

Juliana Viggiano é graduada em Ciências Sociais pela Universidade Federal do Paraná, mestre e doutora em Ciência Política, com ênfase em Política Internacional, pela Universidade de São Paulo. Foi Visiting Scholar na Georgetown University, pesquisadora associada do Núcleo de Pesquisa em Relações Internacionais, (Nupri/USP), co-editora do periódico científico Carta Internacional e professora de Política Internacional no curso de especialização lato sensu em Sociologia Política do Departamento de Ciências Sociais da Universidade Federal do Paraná. Interessa-se pelas áreas de segurança internacional, relações Estados Unidos – América Latina e questões de democracia nas relações internacionais.

Estratégias de Política Externa (4 créditos)

Ter. / Qui. 11h00- 12h50 (EESP)

Prof. Oliver Stuenkel

Oliver Stuenkel é professor adjunto de Relações Internacionais da Fundação Getúlio Vargas com atuação em São Paulo, onde é coordenador da Escola de Ciências Sociais/CPDOC. Ele tem interesse em potências emergentes, especificamente na política externa do Brasil e da Índia e seu impacto sobre a governança global. Sua experiência de trabalho inclui projetos com as Nações Unidas no Brasil, a Cooperação Técnica Alemã (GTZ) nas Ilhas Fidji e a Secretaria do Mercosul em Montevidéu. Ele foi professor visitante na Universidade de São Paulo (USP), na School of International Studies na Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), e professor de colégio no interior do Rajasthan, na Índia. Ele tem graduação pela Universidade de Valência na Espanha, Mestrado em Políticas Públicas pela Kennedy School da Harvard University, onde foi McCloy Scholar, e doutorado em ciência política pela Universidade Duisburg-Essen, na Alemanha.

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A iniciativa é da Escola de Ciências Sociais / CPDOC, sede do Centre de Relações Internacionais da FGV.

Accesse nosso site:  http://www.fgv.br/cpdoc/relacoesinternacionais

Tire suas dúvidas:  ri@fgv.br   Tel. 011-3799-3755

One of the major themes of academic debates in the field of international relations these days is about how the rise of powers such as China, India and Brazil will shape the international system. Both those who see the United States as the indispensable nation, equating US decline to the end of today's order, and those who expect rising powers to assume leadership in today's institutions, predicting the continuation of the current order, seem to have one thing in common: they are informed by what we may call "Western" international relations theories. Considering that the future of global order rests, to a significant degree, in non-Western decision makers' hands, the global academic community's limited knowledge of traditional non-western thinkers - for example Chinese or Indian - seems surprising. After all, rising powers will increasingly be called upon not only to take a seat on the high table, but also to provide thought leadership about how to deal with global challenges effectively.

In this context, Boesche's concise introductory book on Kautilya (also called Chanakya), a famous Indian strategist, is a most welcome contribution. Kautilya was a key advisor to Chandragupta Maurya (317-293 BC), who defeated the Nanda Kings, stopped the advance of Alexander the Great's successors, and was the first ruler to unite the Indian subcontinent. After Chandragupta's conquest of many tribes, his famous grandson Ashoka (268-232 BC) was able to consolidate the empire further. Kautilya thus made a significant mark in the history of India, and several historians have argued that it was Chandragupta who laid - with sometimes harsh methods- the groundwork for Ashoka's reign, which is often described as the "brightest page of India's history". For example, in "Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny", Amartya Sen often used Ashoka's example to argue that human rights and religious tolerance where not a Western invention.

Kautilya is described by historians as both the emperor's "Prime Minister" and the grand theorist of the politics and economics of the Mauryan state, thus comparable to Bismarck regarding his political power and to Machiavelli is his function as a chronicler - leaving, naturally, some doubts about in how far his work is normative and in how far it describes reality. Most agree that his work can be read as an adequate description of his time, yet also serving as a practical manual of how to govern.

Early on, Kautilya stresses the importance of religion as an important force to depoliticize the masses when confronted with state power, thus reducing the risk of rebellion. Kautilya himself, on the other hand, derided superstition and the belief of fate and professed only to believe in science. In matters of foreign policy, his views resemble those of Hobbes in that he considers international politics to be anarchical and expects the rule by the strongest in an ever unstable environment where empires either expand or decline, but rarely stand still.

On the domestic front, Kautilya's insistence on clear and just laws that must be backed by force are reminiscent of Hobbes, who warned of the perils of internal anarchy and strife. It also reflects Machiavellian ideas about the ruler's risks of incurring the hatred of his subjects through arbitrary and unjust legislation. This argument seems somewhat inconsistent from today's perspective as Kautilya also defends the (unjust) caste system to provide social order - "just" seems therefore to imply "predictable" and "measured" rather than "equal". Kautilya only advised the king to break with tradition if doing so enhanced national security: for example, he advocated enlisting low-caste men into the army, even though his activity had been previously reserved for the warrior caste.

In yet another parallel to Machiavelli, Kautilya argues the national interest should override moral principles "inasmuch the moral order depends upon the continued existence of the state." Yet contrary to the Italian thinker, who set no geographical limits to territorial expansion, Kautilya never advocated the conquest of lands outside of South Asia. This line of thought is still visible in modern Indian foreign policy: contrary to virtually all other major powers, India has never taken the initiative to invade a foreign country, and it has never shown interest in conquering areas beyond South Asia.

The chapter on foreign policy is arguably the book’s most interesting, and Boesche depicts Kautilya as a hard-nosed realist for whom war is not an extension of diplomacy (as Clausewitz argued), but who regards every part of diplomacy as part of ‘subtle war’. Diplomacy therefore does not seek to avoid war, but rather to assure that one is successful in warfare which occurs frequently. In short, if one can win, one should go to war, irrespective of whether an agreement of treaty has been signed previously. Even while at peace, a nation should constantly wage ‘hidden war’, consisting of sowing discord among the enemy’s leaders (e.g. by sending women to foreign capitals so beautiful that the enemies' generals turn against each other), or by simply assassinating key figures, preferably with poison.

Similar to Thucydides, who regarded the request for negotiation as a sign of weakness, Kautilya saw little point in it other than to deceive a neighbor before conquering his territory. His advice to merely kill foreign rulers, but treat the population of the conquered territory with respect and honor its deities was not based on moral grounds, but was meant to facilitate the integration into the empire and the enlargement of the army (interestingly enough, he never speaks of proselytizing, which a common goal among Christian and Muslim rulers).

Kautilya’s most significant contribution to foreign policy making remains his ‘mandala theory’, according to which one’s immediate neighbors are enemies, while states on the other side of one’s neighbors are friends. In many cases, this theory seems correct, for example when trying to explain China’s warm ties with Pakistan. And interestingly enough, India’s relationship with its immediate neighbors have been historically bad. Today, the theory seems of unlimited use – quite to the contrary, India’s major challenge today is to turn her immediate neighbors into friends and foster regional integration.

Aside from providing a well-structured summary and interpretation of the Arthashastra, Boesche’s book includes at times comical details of how Kautilya sought to regulate public life, specifying fines for crimes such as “vilifying another for impotence or madness” or how he counseled the king about how to avoid becoming addicted to wine, gambling or women (considering the latter as the most dangerous).

Kautilya's major concern was to always have enough money available to finance a strong army with many elephants, which he regarded as crucial in any war. In the state-dominated economy, he envisioned controlled individual business activities of many kinds to assure that goal – for example, he argued that prostitution and gambling should be made legal, and that said each courtesan should register with the government and pay regular taxes – a policy too liberal for many societies even today.

In sum, what is perhaps most fascinating is how many ideas Kautilya articulated that would appear in the West centuries later – while Kautilya wrote the Arthashastra briefly after Thucydides, he long preceded Machiavelli and Hobbes, which thought along similar lines. Rather than looking for “non-Western” international relations theories, then, it may be more adequate to question the supposedly “Western” origin of today’s existing theories and acknowledge the profound contributions thinkers such as Kautilya have made.

Boesche's book is ideal reading for a seminar on Indian Foreign Policy, providing a very accessible overview of the somewhat lengthy, yet highly rewarding Arthashastra.

Above all, the 7th Turkish-African Congress in Khartoum, organized by TASAM, a Turkish think tank, was yet another impressive sign of Turkey's assertive and dynamic new foreign policy, and its desire to establish a strong presence in Africa. Participants from many African countries - ranging from South Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, the DRC and Senegal - were full of praise for Turkey's newfound interest in their continent. Turkey's trade with Africa has recently exceeded the US$ 10 billion mark - slightly less than one tenth of China-Africa trade, but a tenfold increase since 2000 nonetheless.

Turkey’s opening to Africa began in 2005, when Turkey announced the "Year of Africa.” In 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gül hosted the first ever Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul with the participation of representatives from most African countries. The same year, the African Union (AU) declared Turkey as a "strategic partner". In 2010, Gül toured Africa, taking more than 100 Turkish businessmen with him, seeking to project the image of a benign country and an equal partner, in contrast to resource-hungry China, which many Africans feel ambiguious about. Turkish Airlines now has regular flights to Addis Ababa, Dakar, Johannesburg, Nairobi and Lagos, seeking to turn Istanbul into a major hub for African travelers. By the end of the 2012, there will be 33 Turkish embassies in Africa, with several more to open in the coming years.

One of the most interesting presentations was that given by Abdi Jama Ghedi, Professor at Benadir University in Mogadishu (Somalia), who praised Turkey's courage to engage in his war-ravaged country, which has not had a functioning government since 1991. Turkey hosted the Istanbul Somalia Conference organized within the UN framework in 2010. Turkish Airlines has announced that it will begin to fly to Mogadishu regularly, and Turkey is about to open a functioning embassy in the Somali capital. "The guys from the international organizations fly in from Nairobi during the day, but they're too scared to live in Somalia", Prof. Ghedi says, stressing how much Turkey's gesture means to Somali society. When Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan traveled to Somalia in August 2011, even The Economist, "moved beyond cynicism", recognized that

Mr Erdogan is not the first head of state to visit Somalia's wrecked capital since central authority collapsed there in 1992. But the nature of his visit was different. It was not about regional security. He came with his wife and daughter, his cabinet ministers and their families. The trip was brief and choreographed to boost standing at home. But that should not diminish the courage shown. The Turkish plane scraped the runway on landing. Even though the Shabab had been forced out of the city, the visit was an extraordinary security risk.

Yet Mr Erdogan's presence was a statement of common humanity, a shared future, more eloquent soundbite. It was the message so many Somalis have longed to hear, but which have often sounded strangled from Western capitals, with their the generosity bound by security caveats. In bringing his family to Mogadishu, Mr Erdogan said he wanted to destroy the perception that it was impossible to travel to the city (it does, in fact, remain very dangerous). There was also a spiritual message: Muslims caring for fellow believers during the holy month of Ramadan. By some counts, Turkey has raised $115m for Somali famine victims during the fast.

Turkey is now wildly popular in most countries in Northern Africa, and most Egyptians identify Turkey as the ideal government model to emulate - even though they are unlikely to copy Turkey's rare achievement easily, as Turkey’s secular order has deep roots and goes back to the creation of a republic by Mustafa Kemal almost a century ago.

Yet thankfully, the conference provided space for real debate and critical voices, too. After the presentation by a former Turkish ambassador to Sudan, a South African participant questioned the narrative of Turkey's purely benign Africa strategy, pointing to the conference's title -"Multi-Dimensional Struggle for Africa" - which made Africa look like a helpless target rather than an active parter. He pointed out that Turkey's official rhetoric about Turkish-African friendship omitted Turkey's ambiguous past as a colonizer (in the form of the Ottoman Empire) which once ruled Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and even Niger and Chad.

The retired ambassador replied that Turkey had "reformed" itself long ago then and was no longer an imperial power - yet interestingly, a day earlier, Recai Kutan, a former Turkish Minister, had made particular reference to Turkey's Ottoman past as the basis of Turkey's quest for greater involvement in the region - a past that may one day come to haunt Turkey as it gains greater economic influence in the region.

While no African government is critical of Turkey's presence in Africa today, Turkey must - like Brazil - be careful not to overestimate the honeymoon it is currently experiencing with Africa - as the Chinese example shows, African societies can quickly turn hostile once they feel their growing ties with emerging powers do not provide the promised benefits.

In addition, it remains to be seen how long Turkey is able to walk the diplomatic tightrope between the West and the rest: Turkey, on good terms with Sudan, seeks admission to the European Union (EU), while the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's President, on counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. While the ICC is not connected to the European Union, its decision found strong support among Europe's leaders, and it is often seen as a 'European institution' in Africa. Over lunch, an African participant muttered that one must not forget that Turkey was "essentially a Western power, economically and strategically tied to Europe and the United States".

Nonetheless, Turkey's engagement with Africa can be deemed a great success - and Turkey will certainly be a force to reckon with in Africa, as well as an important example to study for other emerging powers eager to strengthen ties with Africa.